

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 STATE 073442

20

ORIGIN NEA-04

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /005 R

66665

DRAFTED BY: NEA: WSBTUCHER

APPROVED BY: NEA: WSBUTCHER

----- 109994

O 190651 Z APR 73

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 073442

KATHMANDU FOR ASST SECY SISCO

FOLLOWING SENT ACTION USUN NEW YORK APRIL 18, 1973 FROM SECSTATE
WASHDC IS REPEATED TO YOU: QUOTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 4547

E. O. 11652: XGDS

TAGS: PINS PFOR LE IS UN

SUBJECT: SC DEBATE: USG CRITICAL

REF: BEIRUT 4501

SUMMARY: CONFIRMING MY TELCON WITH DEPALMER AND KORN,
I HAD MEETING WITH LEBANESE FONMIN ABOU HAMAD, SEC GEN
SADDAQA AND HADDAD AFTERNOON APR 18 DURING WHICH FONMIN
MADE EVERY EFFORT FIND DRAFT SC RES WHICH USG COULD ACCEPT.
FONMIN IN MY PRESENCE INSTRUCTED GHORRA IN NEW YORK AS TO
WHAT CHANGES GOL COULD ACCEPT, OVERRIDING GHORRA PRO-
TESTATIONS THAT EGYPT AND USSR AND PERHAPS OTHERS WOULD
NOT AGREE. FONMIN SAID THAT USG VETO IN SC WOULD BE
"CATASTROPHIC" FOR UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH LEBANON;
WOULD CAUSE SERIOUS DAMAGE TO OUR RELATIONS WITH ARABS
GENERALLY, AND WOULD CREATE EXTREMELY SERIOUS SECURITY RISK
FOR AMERICAN CITIZENS AND INTERESTS IN LEBANON. I FULLY CON-
CUR IN FONMIN'S ASSESSMENT OF CONSEQUENCES USG VETO. END
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 073442

SUMMARY.

1. FONMIN BEGAN MEETING BY SAYING THAT GOL ATTACHES GREATEST IMPORTANCE TO USG POSITION IN SC DEBATE, WISHES MAKE EVERY EFFORT IT CAN TO AVOID CATASTROPHIC CONSEQUENCES OF USG VETO, AND WILLING MAKE EVERY FEASIBLE CONCESSION TO OBTAIN AFFIRMATIVE USG VOTE. ABOUHAMAD WENT ON TO SAY THAT USG VETO AND POSSIBLY EVEN ABSTENTION WOULD BE SEEN AS " GREEN LIGHT" FOR FURTHER ISRAELI ATTACKS ON LEBANESE TERRITORY AND WOULD VERY SERIOUSLY DAMAGE UNITED STATES POSITION IN LEBANON. HE STRESSED VERY TENSE NATURE OF SITUATION, WITH FEDAYEEN AND OTHER RADICALS WAITING FOR ANOTHER USG (OR ISRAELI) MOVE TO FURTHER ATTACK BOTH USG AND GOL. HE SAID THAT SHOULD THIS OCCUR, THERE WOULD BE EXTREMELY SERIOUS THREAT TO AMERICAN LIVES AND PROPERTY, STARTING WITH AMERICAN EMBASSY AND OFFICIALS. HE ALSO STATED OPINION THAT UNITED STATES POSITION WOULD BE SERIOUSLY HARMED IN OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES SINCE USG ACTION IN SC WOULD BE SEEN AS CONFIRMATION OF RADICAL CHARGES THAT USG WAS ACCOMPLICE IN BEIRUT RAID. GOL DOES NOT RPT NOT WISH TO ISOLATE AND PUT IN DANGER USG INTERESTS. GOL WISHES MAINTAIN VERY CLOSE RELATION WITH USG, AND HOPES FOR CONTINUED CLOSE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN LEBANON AND UNITED STATES ON NON- GOVERNMENTAL BASIS WHICH HAS SO LONG EXISTED. MORE-OVER, GOL WISHES TAKE ADVANTAGE OF SC DEBATE IN ORDER GET ARABS ON RECORD BEHIND RES WHICH DOES CONDEMN ALL ACTS OF VIOLENCE. THIS WOULD GIVE GOL USEFUL TOOL WITH FEDAYEEN ONCE PRESENT STATE OF TENSION DIES DOWN. GOL WANTS WORK FOR BALANCED SC RES BUT THIS MEANS TRULY BALANCED IN ACCORDANCE WITH FACTS OF SITUATION AND NOT BALANCED IN FAVOR OF ISRAEL. WE THEN PROCEEDED DISCUSS IN DETAIL WHAT GOL MIGHT BE ABLE ACCEPT.

2. FONMIN WAS WORKING FROM LATEST UK/ FRENCH DRAFT RES (WHICH WE HAD NOT SEEN BUT WHICH HE GAVE US) AND AMBASSADOR SCALI' S SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS(WHICH HE SHOWED US, SAYING AMBASSADOR GHORRA ASSURED HIM THEY HAD BEEN MADE WITH DEPT APPROVAL). FONMIN SAID THAT GOL COULD NOT ACCEPT US SUGGESTION THAT BOTH BEIRUT RAID AND OTHER TERRORISTACTS BE CONDEMNED IN SAME PARAGRAPH, BUT WILLING DO IT IN TWO OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS AS IN UK/ FRENCH DRAFT. WHEN IT COMES TO SPECIFIC MENTION OF TERRORIST ACTS, GOL WILLING ACCEPT SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO KHARTOUM IN OPERATIVE OR PREAMBULAR PARA IF IT WOULD PRODUCE AFFIRMATIVE US VOTE. I ARGUED NICOSIA SHOULD ALSO BE INCLUDED, BUT FONMIN SAID THIS MORE THAN TRAFFIC
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 073442

WOULD BEAR UNDER PRESENT TENSE CIRCUMSTANCE IN LEBANON. SAME

TRUE OF US SUGGESTION ON INCLUDING OPERATIVE PARA (TAKEN FROM FRIENDLY RELATIONS DECLARATION) ON NOT ENCOURAGING TERRORIST ACTS.

3. FONMIN SAID THAT THIS SORT OF LANGUAGE IN OPERATIVE PARA SC RES AT THIS TIME APPEARS TO BE SC ENDORSEMENT OF ALL- OUT ANTI-TERRORISTCAMPAIGN WHICH GOL FAVORS BUT CANNOT ENDORSE PUBLICLY AT THIS TIME INTHIS WAY. AFTER CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION IN WHICH I STRESSED IMPORTANCE USG ATTACHES TO LANGUAGE AND ARGUED THAT IT ALREADY ACCEPTED UNANIMOUSLY BY GA IN 1970, FONMIN AGREED TO REFER TO SPECIFIC RES ON FRIENDLY RELATIONS IN PREAMBULAR PARA. (HE ALSO GAVE IMPRESSION GOL WOULD SWALLOW SPECIFIC RECALLING OF LANGUAGE OF KEY PARA FROM RES IF RPT IF THIS WOULD MEAN USG YES VOTE.)

4. FONMIN SAID GOL ABLE DROP OPERATIVE PARA 6 FROM UK/ FRENCH DRAFT AS USG WISHED. WE THEN DISCUSSED OPERATIVE PARA 5. FONMIN UNWILLING ACCEPT PROPOSED US SUBSTITUTE LANGUAGE BUT, AFTER MUCH STUDY, HE AGREED EITHER DROP OPERATIVE PARA 5 ALTOGETHER OR AMEND IT BY ADDING " OR ANY OTHER VIOLENT ACT WHICH IMPEDES SEARCH FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT" AFTER " MILITARY ATTACKS" IN ORDER TO END UP WITH BALANCED OPERATIVE PARA WHICH ASKS ALL STATES TO REFRAIN FROM PROVIDING ANY ASSISTANCE TO ANYONE WHICH WOULD IMPEDE SEARCH FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

5. WHILE I WAS STILL WITH HIM, FONMIN CALLED AMBASSADOR GHORRA IN NEW YORK AND INSTRUCTED HIM SPECIFICALLY AND FIRMLY, REPEATING HIMSELF AND HAVING GHORRA REPEAT BACK TO HIM GOL POSITION AS CONTAINED IN PARAS 2, 3, AND 4 ABOVE. GHORRA FOUGHT HARD AGAINST SOME OF THESE INSTRUCTIONS, SAYING THAT HE HAD PROBLEMS WITH EGYPT (ZAYYAT),
USSR AND VARIOUS OTHERS. (AT ONE POINT
FONMIN TOLD GHORRA THAT ZAYYAT DOES NOT REPRESENT GOL AND EGYPT IS NOT MEMBER SC SO THERE NO REASON FOR GHORRA TO GIVE SUCH WEIGHT TO ZAYYAT' S CRITICISMS.) FONMIN THEN PASSED PHONE TO SECGEN SADDQA WHO REINFORCED INSTRUCTIONS. ABOUHAMAD AND SADDQA CONVINCED GHORRA UNDERSTANDS AND WILL ACT ON THESE INSTRUCTIONS, FIRST GOING TO SEE SCALI. ABOU HAMAD ALSO INSTRUCTED GHORRA TO POST-PONE VOTE IF THERE IS ANY POSSIBILITY OF USG VETO UNTIL HE HAS HAD TIME CONTACT FONMIN, HE AND I HAVE HAD TIME DISCUSS SITUATION, AND I HAVE HAD TIME CONTACT DEPT.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 073442

BUFFUM UNQUOTE ROGERS

CONFIDENTIAL

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

*** Current Classification *** CONFIDENTIAL

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 19 APR 1973
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973STATE073442
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: NEA: WSBTUCHER
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X1 ROGERS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19730449/aaaaivcm.tel
Line Count: 169
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ORIGIN NEA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 73 BEIRUT 4501
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 22 FEB 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: WITHDRAWN <22-Oct-2001 by eisnerah, 3.4.X6>; RELEASED <22 FEB 2002 by golinofr>; APPROVED <25 FEB 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: <DBA CORRECTED> wfs 980128
Subject: SC DEBATE
TAGS: PFOR, PINS, IS, LE, UN
To: N/A
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005